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The Securities and Exchange Commission recently adopted a requirement for U.S. companies to disclose
the disparity between CEO and worker pay. This outcome reflects present tensions between the desire to reward
performance while also seeking to establish what is an equitable division of the wealth generated by today’s
behemoth corporations. The latest requirement is arguably an outcome that has resulted from backlash against
numerous “greedy CEOs” who have made headlines in recent memory for their “pursuit of excessive or
extraordinary material wealth”.
Our most recent article continues a line of work considering what constitutes greed and exploring its ramifications. A
widely held tenet of classical economic theory is that individuals are self-interested. Generally, self-interest has
contributed to work ethic and innovation and consequently to economic growth. However, it is increasingly clear that
self-interest is more complex than previously assumed as it may vary widely at the individual level. Over the last two
decades, in numerous instances managers have demonstrated a level of extreme self-interest that has been
harmful to many others both in and outside of their organizations. Simultaneously, other managers appeared to
exhibit managerial altruism, defined as concern or regard for the needs of others without ulterior motive.
To connect these two extremes, we conceptualize self-interest on a continuum, with greed at one end and altruism
at the other. Greed suggests an individual is excessively focused on self, with virtually no regard for the welfare of
others. Conversely, altruism is focused on the needs of others, even at the exclusion of oneself. This
conceptualization of self-interest on a continuum, with greed and altruism at opposing ends challenges the limiting
assumption of universal self-interest.
In our work, we retrace some of the many examinations of greed in many spheres – philosophical, political,
theological, ethical, economic and social psychological. Up until the early Industrial Revolution, greed was
considered a negative, dark and even sinful trait that generally brought about undesirable consequences for the
individual. Philosophers reasoned that if greed became an accepted social norm adverse societal consequences
would follow. After the unparalleled economic growth of the Industrial Revolution however, perceptions about the
accumulation of wealth shifted. The line between self-interest and greed, still clear in the work of Adam Smith,
became blurred. The study of greed largely disappeared from academic journals.
Altruism, as a concept is “younger” than greed. It was first mentioned by Auguste Comte in 1853 to describe the
counter principle to the assumption that individuals are self-interest maximizers. In other words, altruism stands in
opposition to greed on the self-interest continuum.
Both greed and altruism of managers have pervasive effects on organizations. For example, research has shown
that greed is often present in CEOs with shorter, rather than longer tenure indicating that greedy executives are
focused on short-term decisions and short-term financial outcomes that most benefit them. While greedy behavior is
often presumed to result in negative outcomes, greed might often provide short-term benefits, such as the
temporary uplifts in profit that Volkswagen obtained by skirting environmental regulations. We suggest that CEO
greed is more likely to lead to corporate wrongdoing. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision similarly
cautions about the aggregate effects of greed when stating, “excessive and imprudent risk taking by top executives
motivated by greed represents a major hazard to [the] world economy”. Due to the undesirable effects of greed,
executives suffering from insatiable avarice often are dismissed for ethical violations while others voluntarily leave
their positions in search of even more generous compensation and benefit packages.
In contrast, organizations run by altruistic CEOs are affected by very different influences. Altruism is associated with
corporate citizenship and altruistic CEOs are less likely to focus on securing their own immediate financial returns,
instead emphasizing the long-term success of multiple stakeholders. However, while altruism is generally
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considered to be a desired behavior within an organization, extreme altruism may not always lead to long-lasting or
“successful” organizations. Due to the emphasis on pro-social instead of financial returns, altruistic CEOs’ may
underperform industry benchmarks and be dismissed for performance reasons.
Thus, we propose that the most successful organizational leaders exhibit moderate self-interest. They must be
sufficiently motivated by their incentives to respond to the multiplicity of performance pressures on their organization
in order to stay at the helm; while also ensuring that others—i.e., employees, suppliers, shareholders and other
stakeholders—are able to accomplish their personal and organizational goals). This type of leadership is important
across a variety of organizations, from large, established firms to smaller and newer entrepreneurial firms, including
family businesses. It also is highly relevant in other types of organizations such as non-profit and governmental
organizations.
We hope in our work to contribute to a robust conversation on how greed can negatively affect organizations, while
also considering the presence of many altruistically-oriented managers. In doing so, we acknowledge that
appropriate levels of self-interest can well-serve an organization.
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